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I. INTRODUCTION
AFTER I GAVE A SPEECH at an American Fertility
Society meeting a few years ago, a physician called me aside,
and in hushed tones, asked my advice.1 He had just learned
that one of his sperm donors had been arrested for murder. He
wanted to know whether he had a legal duty to inform the
women who used the man's sperm of this new development.
Several thoughts ran through my mind as I attempted to
answer the question, which seemed to hover on the precipitous
divide in the nature/nurture debate. In the way he posed the
question, the physician implied that this was genetic informa-
tion akin to telling the recipient that the donor had a family
history of early coronary artery disease or breast cancer, rele-
vant due to the information it provided about the child's na-
ture. But as I tried to envision the impact of that information
on the recipient and the child, my concern focused entirely on
its influence on nurture. I wondered whether, each time the
t Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. B.A., Yale
College; J.D., Yale Law School, 1978.
ft Visiting Assistant Clinical Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology. B.A., University of Illinois; J.D., Loyola University of Chicago; M.P.H., Boston
University.
1. References in the first person in this Article refer to the experiences of Lori Andrews.
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child lashed out in anger at a playmate, the mother would
freeze in horror at the idea that her child's genetic predisposi-
tion was unfolding. She might rush in and prevent the child
from engaging in any number of normal behaviors in an at-
tempt to avert the creation of a criminal.
I could not think of any legal reason why such information
should be disclosed, and I could think of any number of social
reasons why it should not be revealed. The incident raised in
my mind a larger question of the type of information about the
child's genetic progenitors to which parents (and the child
himself or herself) might be entitled. Such questions arise in
the areas of adoption, egg donation, sperm donation, embryo
donation, and surrogate motherhood.
There are some instances in which giving genetic informa-
tion to the rearing parents can be beneficial to the child. A
classic case is screening newborns for phenylketonuria (PKU).
If this genetic disease is diagnosed in a newborn, appropriate
treatment with a special diet can prevent mental retardation in
the child. For a limited number of diseases, such as heart dis-
ease, family history may help the parents and, later in life, the
child, engage in preventive strategies for the child's benefit.
On the other hand, there are many instances in which a
child might be stigmatized or harmed by genetic information.
A child may not be adopted at all if the potential parents know
that the child has the gene for a serious late-onset disorder
such as Huntington's disease. Such a possibility led Dorothy
Wertz, Joanna Fanos, and Philip Reilly to recommend restric-
tions on the use of genetic testing in the adoption context.
They suggest that testing should be limited to situations in
which the adoptee may benefit from preventive measures or
treatment: "Testing for untreatable adult-onset disorders prior
to adoption makes the child into a commodity undergoing
quality control."3
Concerns are raised, even outside the adoption context,
about giving biological parents information about their child's
2. Dorothy C. Wertz et al., Genetic Testing for Children and Adolescents: Who Decides?,
272 JAMA 875, 880 (1994) (suggesting that genetic testing in the context of adoption should be
restricted).
3. Id.
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genetic status, other than in cases where such information is
necessary for immediate health care treatment or prevention.
Genetic information can have psychological, social, and finan-
cial implications; some commentators suggest that, except in
limited circumstances where genetic information is needed for
immediate treatment and prevention, the decision about wheth-
er to undergo a genetic test should be postponed until the child
reaches maturity and can make that decision himself or her-
self. Accordingly, it would not seem appropriate that adoptive
parents should have more information about their child than
biological parents.
Given the overemphasis our culture places on genetic
explanations for behavior, generating more genetic information
about a child might not necessarily be good for the child. As
Dorothy Nelkin and Susan Lindee ably demonstrate in their
recent book, The DNA Mystique, our contemporary culture ap-
pears to place greater weight on nature over nurture, and is
inclined to find an explanation for all things in a person's
genes.' They note that since 1983, when the subject heading
"behavioral genetics" first appeared in the Reader's Guide to
Periodic Literature, hundreds of articles on that topic have
appeared, and "among the traits attributed to heredity have
been mental illness, aggression, homosexuality, exhibitionism,
dyslexia, addiction, job and educational success, arson, tenden-
cy to tease, propensity for risk taking, timidity, social potency,
tendency to giggle or to use hurtful words, traditionalism, and
zest for life."6 The authors also discuss how these ideas en-
tered popular culture in novels, movies, soap operas, and ad-
vertisements.
With respect to parenting, Nelkin and Lindee point out
that in the 1970s, childrearing manuals emphasized the impor-
tance of nurturing, while today such manuals indicate that a
child's personality is predestined genetically. Of particular note
4. See COMMrrrEE ON ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, INST. OF MED., ASSESSING GENETIC
RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SociAL POLIcY 10, 260-64 (Lori B. Andrews et al. eds.,
1994).
5. DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A
CULTURAL ICON 104-06 (1995) (suggesting that there is a "general public conversion to the idea
that differences between men and women are genetically determined").
6. Id. at 82.
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is Nelkin and Lindee's description of a 1993 television movie,
Tainted Blood, in which an adopted boy kills his parents.7 In
the movie, a reporter learns that the boy's mother killed her
own parents, too. When the reporter also discovers the boy had
a twin sister, she begins a desperate search for the girl with
"tainted blood" (who indeed committed murder herself). 8
Nelkin and Lindee explain that, despite scientific limita-
tions to such information, genetic explanations for a person's
behavior are readily accepted by the public since "they can
relieve personal guilt by implying compulsion, an inborn in-
ability to resist specific behavior."' Such explanations may
relieve societal guilt and provide an excuse to reduce social
services by deflecting attention away from social and economic
influences on behavior." The authors maintain that "the gene
has been transformed. Instead of a piece of hereditary informa-
tion, it has become the key to human relationships and the
basis of family cohesion. Instead of a string of punches and
pyramidines, it has become the essence of identity and the
source of social difference.""
Given the ascendancy of genetic information, parents
rearing an adopted child may feel that their child's future is
preordained by the genetic information they are provided.
Nevertheless, an individual's genetic family history in-
creasingly is being viewed as an important tool in medical
diagnosis and treatment. Such recognition led state legislatures
to create statutes requiring the collection of genetic information
in the adoption context. A 1987 survey by the American Soci-
ety of Human Genetics found that fifteen states had such stat-
utes. 2 Much has changed since 1987. The collection of genet-
ic information is becoming easier, and technology has in-
creased the number of genetic conditions which are identifiable
through testing. These changes are reflected in the adoption
7. Tainted Blood (USA television broadcast, Mar. 3, 1993).
8. NELKIN & LINDEE, supra note 5, at 86-87.
9. Id. at 145.
10. See id. See also MARQUE-LUISA MIRINGOFF, THE SOcIAL CoSTs OF GENETC
WELFARE (1991) (promoting the notion that society readily accepts genetic rationalizations for a
person's behavior, especially if that behavior is anti-social or criminal).
11. NELKN & LINDEE, supra note 5, at 198.
12. Diane Plumridge et al., ASHG Activities Relative to Education: Heredity andAdoption:
A Survey of State Adoption Agencies, 46 AM J. HUM. GENErICs 208, 208-09.
[Vol. 8:125
1998] ADOPTION, REPRODUCTIVE TECH., & GENETIC INFO. 129
laws of many states.
II. STATE POLICIES REQUIRING COLLECTION
OF GENETIC INFORMATION
At least twelve states require compilation of a social histo-
ry when one is obtainable;13 thirty-four, a medical history;"
twenty-four, a genetic history or history of hereditary condi-
tions;' 5 and twenty-one, a health history.16 Such disclosures
13. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-9-505 (Michie 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-1-103(80), 19-5-
207 (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.022 (2) (g) (West 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2130 (1994);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-205(1) (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-5-3, 32A-5-14 (Michie 1978
& Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.12 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1996) OKLA. STAT.
ANN. fit. 10, § 7504-1.1 (West Supp. 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7.2-2 (1996); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-30-17 (1) (1996); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.33.380 (West 1997); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-7
(1996).
14. ALA. CODE § 26-10A-31(g)(2) (1992); ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.510(a)(3) (Michie
1996); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8706 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-1-103 (80),
19-5-207, 402 (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.022 (2) (g) (West 1997); HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-
14.5 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 16.1506 (Supp. 1997); 750 ILL. COME. STAT. ANN. 50/18.4a (West
1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-2 (West Supp. 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.8 (West 1996);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2130 (1994); LA. CHMD. CODE art. 1125(A)(2) (West 1995); MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-328(a) (1991 & Supp. 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 5D(a)
(West 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.14.§ 710.27(1)(b)&(c) (West Supp. 1997); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 93-17-205(1); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.121(1)(5) (West 1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-107
(2) (1993 & Supp. 1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:15 (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-
41.1(a) (West Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-40 (Michie 1995); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 114(1) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1998); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 373-a (McKinney 1992);
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.12 (Anderson Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7504-1.1
(West Supp. 1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.342 (1997); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2533(b)(12)
(West 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7.2-2 (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1740 (Law. Co-op
1996); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.007 (West 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-17 (1) (1996);
WASH. CODE ANN. § 26.33.350 (West 1997); W. VA. CODE § 484-7 (1996); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.425 (West 1997); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-22-116 (Michie 1997).
15. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-129(A) (West 1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-505 (1993);
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8706 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-207 (1997); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 578-14.5 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 16-1506 (Supp. 1997); 750 ILL. Cow,. STAT. ANN.
50/18.4a (West 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.8 (West 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2130
(1994); LA. CHILD. CODE art. 1125(A)(2) (West 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.79(1) (West
Supp. 1998); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-205(1); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41.1 (West 1993); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-5-3, 32A-5-14 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1995); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 114(1)
(McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1998); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 373-a (McKinney 1992); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3107.09 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7504-1.1(A)
(West Supp. 1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.342 (1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7.2-2 (1996); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-7-1740 (Law Co-op. 1996); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.007 (West 1996);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-30-17 (1) (1996); WiSC. STAT. ANN. § 48.425 (West 1997); WYo. STAT.
ANN. § 1-22-116 (Michie 1997).
16. ALA. CODE § 26-IOA-31(g)(2) (1992); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-129(A) (West
1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-505(a) (1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-746 (West 1993 &
Supp. 1997); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.520 (Banks-Baldwin 1994 & Supp. 1996) (requiring a
health history of the biological parents and relatives to be given to adoptive parents); MINN. STAT.
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can occur without revealing the identity of the adoptee's bio-
logical parents. Not only is this information compiled, but
some states require its disclosure early in the adoption process.
Twenty-three states require disclosure of the known medical
history 7 of the adoptee and his or her biological parents by
the state or county department of social services, licensed child
placing agency, or the court. This disclosure must be made to
the adoptive parents before or soon after finalization of the
adoption."8 Nine states have statutes which require disclosure
of the biological parents' health or medical histories."
ANN. § 257.01 (West 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:19 (1994) (requiring the division or
agency involved in an adoption to release the health history of the natural parent and blood
relatives upon request of an adoptee over 21 or an adoptive parent); N.M. STAT ANN. §§ 32A-5-3,
32A-5-14 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1995) (requiring that the pre-placement study include full
disclosure of the adoptee's health history if known); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 114 (McKinney Supp.
1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-205 (1997) (requiring that biological parents supply a health
history of the child for review by prospective adoptive parents); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 114(1)
(McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1998) (requiring any "information which may be a factor influencing
the child's present or future health" be included in the order of adoption); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-
7.2-2 (1996); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.005 (West 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-17 (1)
(1996) (requiring a health history to be filed in the final adoption report); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A,
§ 2-105(a) (Supp. 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.350 (West 1997).
17. This term is utilized herein to include all health and genetic information.
18. See ALA. CODE § 26-1OA-19(C)(6) (1992); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-501, 9-9-505
(Michie 1993); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8706 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082
(3) (a) (West 1997); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/18.4 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-
17-2 (West Supp. 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.8 (West 1996); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-107 (2)
(1993 & Supp. 1997), 43-128 (Supp. 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41.1 (West Supp. 1997); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-5-3, 32A-5-14 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1995); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 114(1)
(McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1998); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.12 (Banks-Baldwin 1994) ("shall
be filed with the court"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7504-1.1 (West Supp. 1998); OR. REV.
STAT. § 109.342 (1997); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2909(a) (West 1991 & Supp. 1997); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.008 (West 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-17 (1996); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 63.1-223 (Michie 1995); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.33.350 (West 1997); W. VA. CODE.
§§ 48-4-6, 48-4A-6 (1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.93 (Ir), 48.425 (1) (am); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-22-116 (Michie 1997).
19. Amrz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-129(A) (West 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-746
(West 1993 & Supp. 1997); IDAHO CODE § 16-1506 (Supp. 1997) (stating that an "investigative
report including reasonably known or available medical and genetic information regarding both
natural parents and sources of such information" shall be available to the adopting family); KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.520 (Banks-Baldwin 1994 & Supp. 1996) (requiring that a health history
of biological parents and their relatives be given to adoptive parents); LA. CHILD CODE arts. 1124-
1126 (West Supp. 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.121(3) (allowing medical history to be released
to adoptive parents or adopted adult upon written request); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:19
(1994) (requiring the division or agency involved in an adoption to release the health history of
the natural parent and blood relatives upon request of an adoptee over 21 or an adoptive parent);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-205 (1997) (requiring health history of biological parents that is "relevant
to the adoption decision"); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-15-01(7)(j)-(16)(s) (1997) (requiring that
nonidentifying information of the genetic parents be furnished to the adoptive parents and adopted
adult). 1997).
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These laws are in keeping with the recommendations of a
number of professional organizations. The American Society of
Human Genetics (ASHG) states that genetic history should be
included in an adoptee's record, asserting that "[elvery person
should have the right to gain access to his or her medical re-
cord, including genetic data .... "20 The ASHG recommends
that "[w]hen medically appropriate, genetic data may be shared
among the adoptive parents, biological parents and
adoptees."'2 The Child Welfare League of America similarly
recommends disclosing known hereditary conditions of the
biological parents and the child to the adoptive parents.2
Some state agencies use special questionnaires to gather
genetic information about parents, siblings, half-siblings, grand-
parents, aunts, uncles, and cousins. The Wisconsin Department
of Human Services collects information regarding nearly sev-
enty specific conditions.2 In Illinois, an adoption intake form
is used by a state agency to ask questions about biological par-
ents and their biological relatives. However, there is no nation-
al standardized form to record the health information of biolog-
ical parents, adoptees, and other relatives.
Currently, no statutes require that biological parents actu-
ally undergo genetic testing. Instead, the statutes refer to a
collection of information that is "known," "available," "obtain-
able," or "reasonably known."' In Virginia, for example,
20. American Society of Human Genetics, American Society of Human Genetics Social
Issues Committee Report on Genetics and Adoption: Points to Consider, 48 AM. J. HUM.
GENEiTICS 1009, 1010 (1991) (stating the ASHG position on the collection genetic information for
adopted children).
21. Id.
22. Child Welfare League of America, Standards for Adoption Service, § 4.13,
Washington, D.C.: CWLA, 1988. The recommendation is somewhat limiting, though. It reads:
Except as limited by statute, special circumstances, or the wishes of the parties to the
adoption, adoptive parents should be given full disclosure of information about the
birth parents and the child to be adopted. ...
This information should include:
Known hereditary and other conditions - problems that may either appear later or
adversely affect future development (the advice of appropriate consultants is important
both to determine scientifically any risks and to know how to interpret them).
23. Department of Health and Human Serv., Div. of Community Serv., State of Wisconsin
Family History Questionnaire: Medical/Genetic, DCS-149 (Rev. 4/93).
24. See, e.g., ARJz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-129(A) (West 1989) ("reasonably available");
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-501 (Michie 1993) ('When obtainable"); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8706 (West
1994 & Supp. 1998) ("if available; ... so far as ascertainable"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-207
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when a petition for adoption is filed with the court, a report
must be filed including, among other things, "relevant physical
and mental history of the parents if known to the person mak-
ing the report. However, nothing in this subsection shall re-
quire that an investigation be made."'  Some states do attempt
to gain access to birth parents' medical records. z6 In some
states, the adoption report must include a report of any physi-
cal exam which either birth parent had within one year before
(1997) ("if obtainable"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-746 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997) ("to the
extent reasonably available"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.022 (2) (g) (West 1997) ("when available");
HAw. REv. STAT. § 578-14.5 (1993) ("if known"); IDAHO CODE § 16-1506 (Supp. 1997)
("reasonably known or available"); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/18.4 (West 1993) ("known");
IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.08 (West 1996) ("known"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2130 (1994)
(requiring a complete genetic, medical, and social history of the child and the parents, and if the
information is not available, then an affidavit explaining the reasons why the information is not
filed must be included); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.529(1) (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1997) (stating
that if the agency receives written data concerning genetic information about biological relatives,
the agency will make a diligent effort to pass it on to the adoptive parent); LA. CHILD CODE art.
1125(A) (West 1995) ("if known"); Id. at art. 1126 (requiring a "good faith effort to obtain");
MICH. CoM,. LAWS ANN. § 710.27 (West Supp. 1997) ("reasonably obtainable"); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 453.121 (West 1997) ("if known"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-146.02 (1993) ("available");
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:15 (1994) ("reasonably available"); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41.1
(West 1993 & Supp. 1997) ("available"); N.M STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-3 (Michie 1978 & Supp.
1995) ("known"); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW 114(1) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1998) ("available");
N.C. GEN STAT. § 48-3-205 (1997) ("known"); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.12 (Banks-
Baldwin Supp. 1996) ("if known"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7504.1.1(A)(1)(a) (West Supp.
1998) ("reasonably available"); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.342 (1997) (requiring the medical history
to be "as complete as possible under the circumstances" and listing information to be included
"[w]hen possible"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1740 (Law. Co-op. 1996) ("known"); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWs § 25-6-15.2 (Michie 1992) ("if known"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-133 (1996)
("available"); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.007 (West 1996) ("available"); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-30-16 91(g) (1996) ("when obtainable"); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-223(D) (Michie 1995)
("known"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.350 (2) (West 1997) ("known or available"); W. VA.
CODE § 48-4-6 (Supp. 1997) (entitling adoptive parent or parents access to all "known
circumstances" surrounding the birth and the medical history of the child); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-
22-116 (Michie 1997) ("available").
Several states do not qualify the information. See ALA. CODE § 26-1OA-19 (1992);
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-2 (Michie Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-328 (1991 &
Supp. 1997) (amended 1992, removing "whenever possible" language); Wisc. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.425 (West 1997).
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-223(D) (Michie 1995) (omitting any statutory requirement that
biological parents actually undergo genetic testing).
26. Only a few states make specific reference to obtaining the birth parents' medical
records. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-14.5 (1993) (obtaining from natural parents the written
consent to release information); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-205(1)(b) (1994) ("A report of any
medical examination which either birth parent had within one (1) year before the petition for
adoption, if available"); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2102 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997) (including the
medical records and other information of an adoptee's natural family in the definition of
"[m]edical history information"); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 48.425(l)(am)(1) (West 1997) (requiring
the medical and genetic history of the birth parents).
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the petition for adoption.27
The fact that generally there is no affirmative duty to
order tests on the child or parents as a way to collect genetic
information is illustrated by Foster v. Bass," which exempli-
fies courts' reluctance to find such a duty owed by adoption
agencies. In Foster, the adoptive father of an child severely
retarded as a result of phenylketonuria filed suit against doc-
tors, the hospital, and the private adoption agency asserting the
negligence of all defendants in failing to test the child for
PKU."9 Catholic Charities, the adoption agency, gave the
adoptive parents a standard medical information form which
provided spaces for information about the baby's race, sex,
blood type, and other information including PKU test re-
sults.3" The PKU space, though, was left blank on the adopted
child's form. The Fosters brought the form to their pediatrician
when they took the child for an examination. Catholic Charities
also gave the parents a Placement Examination Report form.
This form was to be given to the physician for completion and
returned to the agency as part of the adoption procedures,
Catholic Charities required the Fosters to obtain certification
from their own pediatrician that the baby was in good
health." The Fosters' pediatrician noticed the blank left beside
PKU on the form and presumed the results had not yet been
received. 2 Based on his presumption, the doctor did not order
PKU testing. At the time of the child's birth, PKU testing was
not required by statute;33 however, Catholic Charities and the
Fosters' pediatrician were aware of the test's availability as
27. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-205(l)(b) (1994); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 48.425(l)(am)(2)
(West 1997) (requiring "report of any medical examination which either birth parent had within
one year before the date of the petition").
28. 575 So.2d 967 (Miss. 1990) (upholding summary judgment in a case in which the
father of an adopted child sued an adoption agency for failing to test the child for
phenylketonuria).
29. Id. at 968.
30. See id. at 970.
31. See id. at 976 (noting that since the adoption agency had no doctors on its staff, it was
allowed to rely on the expertise of physicians with regard to a child's health).
32. See id. at 970-71 (noting that Dr. Nichols, a PKU-testing advocate, insisted that he
would have performed a PKU test if he had known the child had not been given one, yet he took
no affirmative steps to discover what the blank line on the form actually meant). Tests may take as
long as 2 months to be returned. See id. at 971.
33. See id. at 976 (noting that PKU testing became mandatory "with the enactment of Miss.
CODE ANN. § 41-21-203, and its subsequent amendment in 1985").
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indicated by Catholic Charities' inclusion of it on the medical
information form and the doctor's own involvement with insti-
tuting mandatory screening at a local hospital.'
The court found, however, that "creation of the medical
information form does not obligate Catholic Charities to make
sure it is completed and that all things on the form are exam-
ined. ' 5 The court found no duty on the part of Catholic Char-
ities to conduct the test. 6 It was not disputed that if Catholic
Charities had known the information it would have had a duty
to disclose such information, but, according to the court,
"Catholic Charities had no information about PKU testing to
convey to anyone."" This rationale seems to encourage igno-
rance; if agencies do not inquire, they do not have to disclose.
Realizing that children with health problems are more difficult
to place, it would not be surprising if agencies were reluctant
to probe into a child's medical background, let alone take the
initiative in performing diagnostic tests. The court's concluding
comments support agency passivity: 'There is no evidence of
misrepresentation or fraud. Neither is there evidence that Cath-
olic Charities did not do all that it could. It disclosed what
information it had."38 The court feared that finding Catholic
Charities liable would bring about much litigation which would
inhibit agencies from continuing to provide services. In a foot-
note, the court opined that "[w]hen tragedies such as this oc-
cur, we can not put an agency at fault because a child did not
conform to specifications that adopting parents desire ....
[Agencies] could not afford an unreasonable responsibility of
guaranteeing the health of a child. Even natural parents are
without this guarantee.' 39
Information collected at the time of the child's adoption
may be of limited value. Parents who surrender children for
adoption are often young. Therefore there is only a limited
amount of information known about the biological parents'
34. Foster v. Bass, 575 So.2d 971 (Miss. 1990).
35. Id. at 978 (noting the court dismissed the form as merely a tool "to assist the parents
and their personal pediatricians").
36. See id. at 977.
37. Id. at 983.
38. Id. at 983-84.
39. Id. at 984 n.22.
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own health; many diseases will not be manifested at that time.
Requiring information about other family members, such as
grandparents (as is done in at least ten states), 4° will provide
further clues, but the lack of a mechanism for updating this
information will limit the potential benefits to the child of
possessing this genetic information. Currently, Texas is the
only state that mandates updating health information.4" The
Texas law states:
The department, licensed child-placing agency, parent, guardian,
person, or entity who prepares and files the original report is
required to furnish supplemental medical, psychological, and
psychiatric information to the adoptive parents if that informa-
tion becomes available and to file the supplemental information
where the original report is filed.4"
Although no penalties are imposed by the statute for failing to
supplement the record, the language emphasizes the importance
placed on updating medical information. A Delaware statute,
although not requiring affirmative steps to amass updated infor-
mation, does require that:
If [the] Family Court receives a report stating that a birth par-
ent, another offspring of the birth parent or the adoptee has a
genetically transmitted disorder or family pattern of a disease,
Family Court shall instruct the agency that was involved with
the adoption... to conduct a diligent search for the adult
adoptee, adoptive parents of a minor adoptee or birth parent(s)
to inform them of the report."3
A similar situation exists in the context of most reproduc-
tive technologies. A few state statutes require the collection of
genetic information about sperm donors," and in one case egg
40. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-501(8)-9-9-505 (Michie 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 45a-746 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997); HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-14.5 (1993); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 93-17-205(1) (1994); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-107(2) (1993 & Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 7504-1.1(B)(2)(b) (West Supp. 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7.2-2 (1996); TEx. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 162.007(d) (West 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-16 (1) (g) (1996); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 48.425(l)(am)(1) (West 1997).
41. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.005(f) (West 1996) (mandating that adoptive parents
be furnished with updated medical information regarding the adopted child).
42. Id.
43. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 924 (Supp. 1996) (requiring that the court records of any
adoption be kept "strictly confidential").
44. See, e.g., Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3111.35(A)(2)(a) (Banks-Baldwin 1995) (requiring
disclosure of genetic information by all parties involved in artificial insemination).
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donors,45 but such information generally is not for the purpose
of informing the recipient or the resulting child. Rather, it is to
exclude as donors those men, or women, with particular genet-
ic mutations, such as Tay-Sachs. Florida, Virginia, and New
Hampshire have statutes requiring medical screening of surro-
gate mothers.' Beyond the few statutes on point, there is a
medical standard of care, created by the practice of genetic
screening of donors and the standards embodied in the Ethical
Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies of the
American Fertility Society.47 The guidelines require the taking
of a genetic history and the provision of certain genetic tests
for the purpose of excluding potential sperm donors, egg do-
nors, embryo donors, or surrogates who are thought to present
high risks such as men or women who carry the Tay-Sachs
gene.48 In addition, the guidelines provide that the genetic
information collected without identifying information should be
available on request to the infertile couple and the resulting
child.49 As with the adoption statutes, no provision is made
for updating the information. The only exception is with re-
spect to surrogate motherhood which, ironically, is handled by
lawyers, not physicians. Lawyers have required the surrogate
mothers to keep them informed of any address changes for the
next eighteen years in case the child needs additional informa-
tion."o
In states that do not provide adoptees, or the children born
of reproductive technologies, with a statutory right to genetic
45. N.H. RPv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:14 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (requiring gamete donors to
be "medically acceptable").
46. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (2) (b) (West 1997) (requiring that the surrogate agree to
submit to "reasonable medical evaluation and treatment"); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160 (Michie
1995) (setting forth the requirements for the petition and hearing for court approval of the
surrogacy contract); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:13 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (requiring a woman
who undergoes in vitro fertilization to be medically acceptable).
47. The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, Ethical Considerations of the
New Reproductive Technologies, 46 FERTILITY AND STERnIrY Is, 83s-45s (Supp. 1 1986).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See LORI B. ANDREWS, NEW CONCEPTIONS: A CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO THE NEWEST
INFERTILITY TREATMENTS, INCLUDING IN VTRo FERTILIZATION, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION, AND
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 280-81 (1984) (giving example of a provision in surrogate mother
contract developed by attorneys); see also LORI B. ANDREWS, BETWEEN STRANGERS: SURROGATE
MOTHERS, EXPECTANT FATHERS, & BRAvE NEW BABIES (1989) (discussing relationships among
all parties in surrogate mothering context).
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information, and in all states in which the offspring later de-
sires additional genetic information such as when the individual
himself or herself reaches reproductive age and wants to know
about genetic risks to select prenatal tests or make other repro-
ductive decisions, questions arise regarding whether the indi-
vidual can sue to obtain that information.
When identifying information is sought, most states permit
disclosure only if good cause is shown,51 the court determines
the information is necessary,52 or the interested parties mutu-
ally consented to such disclosure. 3 Under the "good cause"
standard, adoptees are able to get certain non-identifying infor-
mation, such as health insurance information, but not informa-
tion that identifies individuals. In a frequently cited case in-
volving disclosure, the court suggested that "[a] need to have
access to family medical histories or information regarding the
child's heredity may constitute good cause where the evidence
presented in court shows a valid justifiable need to obtain the
information requested."' The court noted further: "[r]equests
for medical, hereditary or ethnic background information
should be granted, absent some showing of compelling reasons
not to reveal the information."55 Another court suggested that
"[u]pon an appropriate showing of psychological trauma, medi-
cal need, or of a religious identity crisis ... the New York
courts would appear required under their own Statute to grant
permission to release all or part of the sealed adoption re-
cords."56 Thus, these cases, like the statutes, would appear to
support disclosure of genetic information in at least some in-
stances.
51. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-217(2)(A) (Michie 1997) (requiring a court order
finding good cause for disclosure); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.93 (ld) (West 1997) (stating that
records may be disclosed "by order of the court for good cause shown").
52. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 925 (Supp. 1996); CAL. FAM. CODE §9203 (West
Supp. 1994).
53. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-IOA-31(C) (1992); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.433 (West 1997)
(providing the statutory limits and requirements for gaining access to identifying information
about parents).
54. Mills v. Atlantic City Dept. of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 654 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1977) (holding that psychological need may constitute good cause to reveal information to
adoptees where the state fails to show a compelling reason not to reveal the information).
55. I at 655.
56. ALMA Society, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1233 (2d Cir. 1979) (footnote omitted)
(requiring a showing of "good cause" before adoption records can be released).
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In at least eighteen states, the artificial insemination laws,
like the adoption laws, allow access to records under the good
cause standard or similar proof of compelling reasons.57 Thus,
the court cases from the adoption realm could be applied by
analogy to children conceived through sperm donation. Howev-
er, the type of information children of artificial insemination
would receive might be of a lesser scope. Since state agencies
are not involved in artificial insemination, it may be difficult to
determine where the record is located and, because physicians
attempt to protect the anonymity of donors, the record is un-
likely to contain any identifying information that would allow
the resulting child, or even the physician providing the insemi-
nation, to recontact the donor for information.
Despite statutes, case law, and practices encouraging the
collection of information, the information is only as good as
the people collecting it. Unless those collecting the information
are familiar with genetics, they may not be able to probe ade-
quately. The form used in Illinois includes inquiries about
physical descriptions and inquiries about specific medical con-
ditions in various categories including: Congenital Impair-
ments; Allergies; Eye, Ear, Developmental Disorders; Circula-
tory Disorders; Hormonal Disorders; Respiratory Disorders;
Lymphatic Disorders; Nervous System Disorders; Infection,
Hospitalization; and Other Impairment, Allergy Disorder, or
Disease.58 Such forms purport to amass a great deal of signifi-
cant information for adoptees and adoptive parents, but unless
all the questions are asked and the respondent is questioned in
a way he or she understands, these inquiries will not produce
information that benefits the adoptee.
There are a number of ways that the collection of genetic
information in the adoption context could be enhanced. Disclo-
sure of known or available information is a step in the right
57. Access to the file seems to be disallowed by some states. See IDAHO CODE § 39-
5403(2) (1993) (restricting access to artificial insemination files to research and statistical
purposes only, unless pursuant to a court order); N.M STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (Michie 1994)
(providing that where a woman is artificially inseminated from sperm other than her husband's,
the husband's signature of consent will be "kept confidential and in a sealed file" with the health
services division of the department of health and is subject to inspection upon an order of the
court for good cause shown).
58. DEPARTMENT OF CHiLDREN AND FAM. SERv., STATE OF ILLINOIS, ADOPTION INTAKE
FoRMs.
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direction, but to make such disclosure meaningful, those col-
lecting the information need to know what questions to ask to
elicit useful responses. One possible mechanism for gaining
accurate and comprehensive medical information would be to
enlist medical student volunteers to conduct medical interviews
of biological parents during the intake process. Another poten-
tial solution may be to develop a uniform training program
with the assistance of physicians from various disciplines,
genetic counselors, and social workers, and then require all
intake workers to undergo training. As important to determin-
ing what should be included in such an effort is what activity
should be excluded. Genetic testing of the child should not be
undertaken unless immediate treatment or preventive therapy is
available. Genetic testing of the biological parents should not
be required. Neither should biological parents and adoptees
have any obligation to undergo genetic testing in order to col-
lect health, medical, or genetic information.59
m. ACCESS TO IDENTIFYING INFORMATION
In the adoption setting, children may gain access to infor-
mation not enumerated in the statute only if they can demon-
strate "good cause" for wanting access.6 Case law indicates
that "good cause" is a stringent requirement when the adoptee
is attempting to obtain identifying information." To determine
whether an adoptee has shown good cause, the interests of all
parties concerned are considered, and the biological parents'
right to privacy is not easily overcome.62 The state's interest
in maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of the adoption
process is linked closely to the interests of the biological
59. See, e.g., Lod B. Andrews, Gen-etiquette: Genetic Information, Family Relationships
and Adoption, in GENErIc SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALI IN A GENETIC
ERA 255 (Mark Rothstein ed., 1997) (discussing reasons why genetic testing of adults and
children should not be required).
60. See, e.g., Alma Society v. Mellon, 601 F.2d. 1225 (2nd Cir. 1979) (finding New York
statute which allowed the release of adoption records to an adult adoptee constitutional, upon a
showing of "good cause," which included upon psychological trauma, medical need, and religious
identity crises).
61. Id. (considering whether "good cause" is a sufficient requirement for allowing the
release of otherwise sealed identification information about biological parents who may maintain
an expectation of privacy).
62. See, e.g., In re George, 630 S.W.2d 684 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
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parents: "It has been assumed that birth parents... want to
erase the adoption from their lives... and confidentiality pro-
tects the natural parents' lives from future disruption."63 In
order to assure the birth mother that she may indeed go on
with her life without the-stigma of having borne an illegitimate
child, or being unable to care for a child, and to insure that she
may live free from fear of disruption, the states enacted the
sealed records statutes.
The rationales offered for maintaining the confidentiality
of the adoption record are as follows: assuring the biological
parents an opportunity to "move on and attempt to rebuild their
lives;"'  enabling adoptive parents to raise the "child without
fear of interference from the natural parents and without fear
that the birth status of an illegitimate child will be revealed or
used as a means of harming the child or themselves;"65 and
protecting "the child from any possible stigma of illegitima-
cy... insur[ing] that the relationship with his or her new
parents can develop into a loving and cohesive family unit
uninvaded by a natural parent who later wishes to intrude into
the relationship."'
During the 1930s and 1940s, social workers and adoptive
parents supported legislation limiting access to adoption re-
cords and, by 1950, most state laws required sealed adoption
records.67 Until recently, "each member of the adoption tri-
angle was stigmatized: the birth mother was 'promiscuous,' the
child a 'bastard,' the adoptive parents 'barren.""'6 The stigma
associated with adoption is one of the reasons why the process
63. Sarah E. Nugent, Comment, The Release of Nonidentifying Information to Adopted
Children: Striking a Balance Between the Rights of Biological Parents and Adopted Children, 23
RuTGERS L.J. 709, 712-13 (1992) (comparing a natural parent's right to privacy with the rights of
the adoptee).
64. Mills v. Atlantic City Dept. of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 649 (N.J. Super. CL Ch.
Div. 1977) (describing a rationale for the privacy provided by the state during a "traumatic and
emotionally tormenting" period in parents' lives).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Susan K. Goodman, Adoption of What? Information Policy for Records of
Adoption in the U.S., REC. MGMT. Q., Apr. 1993, at 3, 8 (documenting legislative trends in
keeping adoption records sealed).
68. Janet Hopkins Dickson, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents: Substance or
Spector?, 38 UCLA L. REv. 917, 926 (1991) (explaining that this historical stigmatization still
shapes adoption law and practice).
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has been cloaked in secrecy. To protect the interests of all
parties concerned, adoption records were sealed and specific
authorization was required for disclosure. 9
The theory underlying sealed records was that such secre-
cy would promote and protect the interests of all parties in-
volved. For example, it was assumed that the state's interests
in promoting adoption would be hampered without the assur-
ance of confidentiality. Even today, some commentators sug-
gest that without the guarantee of privacy, "the natural parents
will resort to abortions or to the black market, or they will fail
to divulge personal information necessary to the adoption pro-
ceedings."7° Moreover, some commentators argue that "confi-
dentiality protects the natural parent's lives from future disrup-
tion,"7 as well as the lives of the adoptive parents who may
feel threatened by the adoptive child's contact with his or her
biological parents.72 Other commentators, though, argue that
disclosure may actually prevent disruption of the adoptive
parents' lives. "[W]hat many are beginning to realize... is
that increased disclosure gives adoptive parents the opportunity
to make an informed decision regarding their emotional and fi-
nancial ability to adopt the particular child."7"
Only Virginia purports to define what constitutes "good
cause" for disclosure. The term "good cause" is defined as "a
showing of a compelling and necessitous need for identifying
information."'74 Florida, however, does enumerate factors to be
considered in assessing "good cause" which are far more spe-
cific than the definition set forth in the Virginia legislation.
The Florida statute reads:
In determining whether good cause exists, the court shall give
primary consideration to the best interests of the adoptee, but
must also give due consideration to the interests of the adoptive
69. See Gloria L. Kelly,, Getting to Know You: Disclosure of Information Contained in
Sealed Adoption Records Under Connecticut Public Act 87-555, 5 CONN. PROB. L.J. 81, 84-85
(1989).
70. Nugent, supra note 63, at 712.
71. Id. at 713.
72. See id.
73. Marci J. Blank, Note, Adoption Nightmares Prompt Judicial Recognition of the Tort of
Wrongful Adoption: Will New York Follow Suit?, 15 CARDOzo L.R. 1687, 1716 (1994) (citation
omitted).
74. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-236 (Michie 1995) (defining the condition upon which the
commissioner will disclose identifying information from an adoption file).
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and birth parents. Factors to be considered in determining
whether good cause exists include, but are not limited to:
1. The reason the information is sought;
2. The existence of means available to obtain the de-
sired information without disclosing the identity of the birth
parents, such as by having the court, a person appointed by the
court, the department, or the licensed child-placing agency
contact the birth parents and request specific information;
3. The desires, to the extent known, of the adoptee, the
adoptive parents and the birth parents;
4. The age, maturity, judgment and expressed needs of
the adoptee; and
5. The recommendation of the department, licensed
child-placing agency, or professional which prepared the pre-
liminary study and home investigation, or the department if no
such study was prepared, concerning the advisability of disclo-
sure.
75
In trying to establish good cause to receive identifying
information, mere curiosity is not enough.76 Some adoptees
have tried to show that their need to know has had a disturbing
effect on their lives that can only be relieved by receiving
identifying information, but courts have not readily granted
such requests. In one case, the court did not find an adoptee's
need to know to be sufficiently strong because, although he
argued that he had "a deep personal need to know the truth,
77
and was distracted by not knowing, he had not received medi-
cal or psychological assistance, nor had his professional life
been affected adversely by his distress. 78 In another case, a
woman argued that her profound depression was due to not
knowing the identities of her biological parents,79 but the
court refused to release the information. The court was influ-
enced by the fact that although an expert witness indicated that
the release of the information would help her recover from her
75. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.162(4) (West 1997).
76. See Linda F.M. v. Department of Health of New York, 418 N.E.2d 1302, 1304 (N.Y.
1981) (declining to grant access to birth records based solely on an adopted child's curiosity).
77. Bradey v. Children's Bureau, 274 S.E.2d 418,420 (S.C. 1981) (finding that the adoptee
failed to provide a compelling interest for the release of confidential identifying information).
78. See id.
79. See Dixon v. Department of Pub. Health, 323 N.W.2d 549, 552-53 (Mich. CL App.
1982) (holding that the plaintiff failed to make a sufficient showing of good cause to allow the
opening of the records).
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depression, the expert also indicated that the depth of her de-
pression resulted from her treatment in the adoptive home, not
from a lack of information about her biological parents.8" An-
other court also rejected an adoptee's assertion that she had a
psychological need to know by holding that "[sihe [was] not
suffering from any mental or physical ailment due to her lack
of knowledge .... "81
Even when an adoptee shows good cause for contacting a
biological parent, courts are reluctant to provide identifying
information. In Application of George, the applicant, an adult
adoptee, was suffering from leukemia.82 His disease was in re-
mission due to drug therapy, but once the drug treatment
ceased to be effective, the only other therapy to induce remis-
sion would have been a bone marrow transplant. The procedure
is most effective when the donor is a blood-related sibling."
In attempting to locate his closest genetic match, the applicant
sought the identities of his biological parents. The trial court
denied his request for disclosure, and the court of appeals
affirmed.
The court reasoned that the trial court must "exert every
proper effort to either obtain consent to disclosure or obtain if
possible necessary information without disclosure"" and such
efforts were made in the case at bar. In a previous opinion, the
court of appeals found that the petitioner had established good
cause. In reaching this decision, the court balanced the follow-
ing interests:
(1) the nature of the circumstances dictating the need for release
of the identity of the birth parents; (2) the circumstances and
desires of the adoptive parents; and (3) "the circumstances of
the birth parents and their desire or at least the desire to the
birth mother not to be identified;" and (4) the interests of the
80. See id. at 552.
81. In re Assalone, 512 A.2d 1383, 1389 (R.I. 1986) (holding that curiosity and a desire to
discover one's natural identity are insufficient reasons to merit disclosure of adoption records).
Petitioner was preoccupied with learning the identities of her biological parents and this
preoccupation affected her social adjustment according to the trial court. See id. at 1387 (review-
ing the trial court's findings).
82. 630 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (regarding an adult leukemic adoptee's attempt to
search for a compatible bone marrow match from his natural family using the assistance of the
court system).
83. See id. at 615.
84. lML at 620.
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state in maintaining a viable system of adoption by the assur-
ance of confidentiality. 5
Based on the finding of good cause, the court ordered the trial
court "to determine if possible, the existence of genetically
appropriate donors and to attempt to obtain consent to disclo-
sure. '86 Following the court's mandate, the trial court judge
personally attempted to gain consent from the biological par-
ents. Having discovered the name of the biological father on
the birth certificate, the judge and the judge's wife met with
the alleged father several times in an effort to gain his consent
to disclose his identity to the adoptee. The alleged father de-
nied paternity and would not submit to a blood test to deter-
mine if he was an appropriate genetic match. The judge went
so far as to offer that he and his wife would also be tested and
he assured the alleged father that no test of paternity would be
done on the blood sample.87 This offer, however, was refused
by the alleged father.
With regard to the biological mother, the judge arranged
to have her and her daughter tested to determine if they were
potential genetic matches. An unidentified nurse performed the
test so as to preserve the secrecy of the birth mother's identity.
The results revealed that the applicant's mother and half-sister
were not appropriate matches.88 Based on the information he
gleaned, the trial court judge found that the identity of the
biological parents should not be disclosed. He recited for the
record "that a confrontation with the natural father would be
'counter productive' whether by the 'court,' the 'applicant,' or
'anyone else."' 89 The court of appeals affirmed, finding that
"[t]he evidence amply demonstrates that the possibility that dis-
closure would result in any benefit to the applicant is so re-
mote as to be very nearly non-existent."'  The court noted
that,
85. In re George, 625 S.W.2d 151, 156 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (listing the balancing of
interests used by the trial judge and determining that the natural father should be contacted before
a decision to disclose, if possible).
86. In re George, 630 S.W.2d at 620 (discussing an earlier opinion in this case).
87. See id. at 618.
88. See id. at 617.
89. Id at 618.
90. Id. at 622-23.
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[b]ecause of [the] unfortunate circumstances of the rarity of the
blood characteristics of the natural mother, the chance that any
half sibling on the father's side might provide a suitable match
theoretically seems to be less than one in a million ......
This case exemplifies the great lengths that courts will go
to in order to preserve the privacy interests of biological par-
ents. The trial court judge, acting as a confidential intermedi-
ary, undertook to do what the plaintiff would have done: deter-
mine if a family member would be an appropriate genetic
match. Finding the possibility of a match with the mother and
her child so slight and the possibility of convincing the alleged
father to give blood highly unlikely, the trial court did not find
plaintiff's circumstances outweighed the policy interest of the
state in maintaining a viable system of adoption through main-
taining anonymity. This decision suggests that few, if any,
instances exist where an adoptee has a compelling reason to
know the identity of his or her biological parents. If the infor-
mation needed can be obtained without information that dis-
closes the biological parents' identities, it appears courts will
take this approach.
Nor have adoptees been successful in trying to create
constitutional rights to access to identifying genetic informa-
tion. Courts have rejected arguments that "by refusing automat-
ic access to birth records that nonadopted persons have, [the
court] is abridging a constitutionally protected right to privacy
and to receive important information,"'  as well as the First
Amendment right of adoptees to receive information,93 their
right to equal protection of laws, which they argued would
entitle them to the same information that non-adopteds can
receive about their natural parents,94 and their fundamental
liberty interest in learning the identity of their biological fami-
ly.9" Courts have found constitutional sealed record statutes and
91. 1l at 619.
92. Mills v. Atlantic City Dept. of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 650 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1977) (discussing the difficulty in striking a balance between the right to privacy and the
adoptee's interest in learning the identity of his or her biological parents).
93. See id. at 652.
94. Id.
95. ALMA Society, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1255, 1230 (2nd Cir. 1979) (rejecting the
argument that learning "the identity of one's natural family is a fundamental right under the Due
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their attendant requirement of a showing of good cause before
allowing access to the information in the adoption record.
According to the Supreme Court of Illinois, in In re Roger B.,
there do not seem to be any "case[s] holding that the right of
an adoptee to determine his genealogical origin is explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution"96 and even if such a
right were recognized, it would not be absolute, but subject to
limitations based on a compelling state need.9
Although collection of genetic information is becoming
more routine, lessening the need to disclose the names and/or
whereabouts of biological parents to obtain such information,
half the states still do not require collection of genetic informa-
tion. Even in states which require the collection of information,
those adoptees placed before such information was collected
regularly still need to learn such information directly from their
biological parents. One court specifically considered a request
by an individual to learn his biological parents' identities to
obtain genetic information. In Golan v. Louise Wise Services,
an adult adoptee suffering from a heart condition sought the
identities of his birth parents.98 According to the plaintiff's
affidavits, access to genetic information would help in treating
his condition and evaluating its severity.' The plaintiff was
adopted in 1932, and the information in the adoption record
most likely was scant. Therefore, he needed to seek the an-
swers to his questions directly from his biological parents.
Additionally, because of the "unknown nature of the risk posed
by plaintiff's condition,"'" plaintiff alleged in his affidavits
that the Federal Aviation Administration required his family
medical history to continue his certification as a commercial
pilot.1"' The court found that the plaintiffs asserted need for
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
96. In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 753 (Ill. 1981) (holding that adoptees do not have a
fundamental right to examine their adoption records).
97. See, e.g., Mills, 372 A.2d at 650-651 (discussing a state's ability to regulate the right to
privacy).
98. Golan v. Louise Wise Serv., 507 N.E.2d 275 (N.Y. 1987) (holding that an adopted
person's need for genetic information for treatment of a heart condition did not automatically give
the adopted person a right to disclosure of the identities of the biological parents). Plaintiff had
obtained a copy of the adoption decree containing the identity of his biological mother and a
reference to the surname of his father. See id. at 276, n. 1.
99. Id. at 276.
100. Id. at 277.
101. See id. at 276-77. (Telephone interview with Stephen Tulin, Defendant's attorney (Nov.
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genetic information did not automatically entitle him to learn
the identities of his biological parents."° Before such infor-
mation can be disclosed, the interests of the adoptee, adoptive
parents, biological parents, and society must be balanced.1 3
The court determined that even though a "preliminary showing
of 'good cause' has been made on the papers, the court may
hold a hearing to determine the effect of disclosure on other
interested parties."'4 The court suggested that the information
plaintiff required may be obtained by utilizing a guardian ad li-
tem as an intermediary to avoid disclosing the identities of his
biological parents while obtaining the information required by
the plaintiff."5
Some states have mechanisms to ease access of adoptees
to identifying information about biological parents, with the
latter parties' implicit or explicit consent. In Michigan, for
example, an adoptee of a post-1980 adoption may obtain iden-
tifying information upon request, unless either biological parent
has filed a written request with the state that the information
not be released. If one parent has requested that identifying
information not be released, identifying information about that
parent will not be disclosed. 1"6
At least twenty states have formal consent registries 7
whereby biological parents and adoptees can learn one
another's identities if there is mutual consent. The purpose of
these registries is to assist birth parents and adoptees in finding
30, 1994)).
102. Id. at 279.
103. See id. at 277.
104. Golan v. Louise Wise Serv., 507 N.E.2d 275 (N.Y. 1987).
105. Id. at 279.
106. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.68(7) (West. Supp. 1997); 750 ILL. CoMP. STAT.
ANN. 50/18.3 (West 1993) (providing that a confidential intermediary may be used for purposes
of contact).
107. The following are states with formal registries. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-503(a) (Michie
1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-2-113.5 (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-755 (West 1993 &
Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-23 (Supp. 1997); 750 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 50/18.3 (West
1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-259A (1993); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1270 (West Supp. 1998); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2706-A (West 1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-4A-02 (1991);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-205 (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.121(10) (West 1997); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 127.007 (1987); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 4138-c(1)-(2) (McKinney 1997); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 109.425-109.507 (1995); RI. GEN. LAws §§ 15-7.2-2 to -15 (1996); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 20-17-1780 (Law. Co-op. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-15.3 (Michie 1992); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 162.401; 162.403 (West 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-18 (1996); W. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 48-4A-1-48-4A-8 (1996).
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one another."°8
Another mechanism used by states to gain access to iden-
tifying information is to employ confidential intermediaries to
obtain the consent of the person whose identity is sought."°
Under the Washington statute, "[t]he intermediary shall search
for and discreetly contact the birth parent or adopted person
.... If the confidential intermediary locates the person being
sought, a discreet and confidential inquiry shall be made as to
whether or not that person will consent to having his or her
present identity disclosed to the petitioner."' 0 Confidential
intermediaries, entitled to reimbursement for actual expenses
from the petitioner,"' are used as either a way to gain con-
sent for disclosure or as a way to obtain requested or necessary
information without disclosing a person's identity. This essen-
tially was the role played by the judge in Application of
George,"2 where the petitioner sought to locate his biological
parents in the hope of finding a bone marrow donor.
Adoption registries and the use of confidential intermedi-
aries are recent developments and reflect a trend of lifting the
veil of secrecy previously shrouding the adoption process," 3
and similarly may be implemented by programs at fertility cen-
ters. One example is the Sperm Bank of California's "Yes"
donor program. As part of the program, donors can agree to
108. See, e.g., LA. CHILD. CODE art. 1270(B) (West 1998) (stating that "[t]he purpose of this
registry shall be to facilitate voluntary contact between the adopted person and the biological
parents."); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.430(1) (1995) (stating that the purpose of the section is to "[s]et
up a voluntary adoption registry where birth parents and adult adoptees may register their
willingness to the release of identifying information to each other").
109. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2905(C) (West 1991); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN.
§ 26.33.343 (West 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-22-203 (Michie 1997).
110. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.343(1) & (5) (West 1997).
111. See id. § 26.33.343(2)(c).
112. In re George, 630 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (describing a court's attempts to
assist an adult adoptee with leukemia in his search for a compatible bone marrow match among
his biological family).
113. See, e.g., Committee on Early Childhood, American Academy of Pediatrics, Adoption
and Dependent Care, Issues of Confidentiality in Adoption: The Role of the Pediatrician, 93
PEDIATRIcs 339, 339-41 (1994); Pamela Manson, Courts Reunite Arizona Adoptees, Birth
Parents, ARIZ. REPUBLIc, Aug. 22, 1993, at B 1 (describing Arizona's Confidential Intermediary
Program which facilitates the reconnection of birth parents and adoptees, if mutually desired). In
1980, only 10 states had mutual consent registries. See Jeffrey Rosenberg, 1988 Survey of State
Laws on Access to Adoption Records, 14 FAM. L. REP. 3017, 3019 (1988) (discussing legislative
trends towards "mutual consent voluntary adoption registries," whereby persons directly involved
in adoptions can register their willingness to meet).
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have their identities disclosed to their offspring upon the
child's request when the child reaches the age of eighteen."1 4
In addition, recent technological advances highlight the impor-
tance of access to certain information so that the benefits of
such technology can be realized. Maintenance of an ongoing
adoption registry and the development of standardized forms
on which biological familial health information is recorded are
important steps in providing biological parents, adoptees, and
their children with necessary information upon which to base
health, reproductive, and lifestyle decisions. However, more
must be done to collect this significant information. Steps also
must be taken to ensure that such information is accurate, but
that collection does not stray beyond areas of medical rele-
vance.
In the future, courts may be faced with the question of
whether adoptees and children conceived with donor gametes
should have access to genetic parents' identities so that they
may update their genetic histories. The possibility of using an
intermediary, such as the judge in the George case, might seem
less appealing in such a situation. Since every adoptee could
make a similar claim for a need to updated genetic informa-
tion, the demand on judges' time would be great. Courts,
swayed by stories in the popular and scientific press, might be
inclined to grant such requests. After all, nary a day goes by
when the newspapers do not report a new gene purported to be
linked to a variety of diseases, conditions, and behaviors from
breast cancer,"5  attempted rape,"6  homosexuality," 7  and
114. See Susan V. Seligson, Seeds of Doubt, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, March 1995, at 28
(discussing a program where sperm donors can agree to have their identities released to their
offspring who have attained the age of 18).
115. Cf. Gina Kolata, Breast Cancer Gene in 1% of U.S. Jews," N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1995,
at A24 (announcing the discovery of a mutation in the BRCA I gene linking one percent of the
Jewish women in the United States to breast cancer); Bob Kuska, BRCA1 Alteration Found in
Eastern European Jews, 87 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1505 (1995) (announcing that a study of
Eastern European Jews showed that an alteration in BRCA 1 gene is present at measurable levels
in the general population).
116. Carmen Lee, Gene May Be a Cause of Being Overweight, PrrrsBURGH POST-GAZE'IE,
Aug. 31, 1995, at C6 (explaining that a mutated gene was discovered that makes people gain
weight faster).
117. See Robert Pool, Evidence for a Homosexuality Gene, 261 SCIENCE 291 (1993)
(suggesting that an uncovered region on the x chromosome appears to contain a gene or genes for
homosexuality).
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obesity.11 8
In recent years, a few courts have begun to show a will-
ingness to order genetic testing outside of the criminal law
context. In a case involving a tort claim, a court ordered Frag-
ile X testing on a young boy based on the defendant
company's attempt to show that the boy's retardation was
genetic, and not due to the company's toxin.119
Yet forcing people to undergo genetic testing runs afoul of
the Fourth Amendment,12 of existing precedents regarding
the right to refuse medical interventions,"' and of the recom-
mendations of national commissions"2  and conferences"2
not to order genetic testing on biological parents."' In our
opinion, judges should also refrain from disclosing parents'
identities in order to allow their adult children to update genet-
ic information. Our opinion is not based on the view that the
biological parents' privacy is sacrosanct; in general, we view
parents as owing a great deal to the children they bring into the
world. Rather, we would like to prevent a genetically deter-
118. Charles C. Mann, Behavioral Genetics in Transition, 264 SCL 1686, 1687 (1994)
(discussing behavioral genetic research, including naming conditions and behaviors occurring as a
result of genetic mutations).
119. Severson v. KTI Chemicals Inc., No. 698517 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 9, 1994) (ordering
plaintiff to give blood samples for DNA and high-resolution chromosomal analysis). For a
published source describing the case and subsequent appeal, see Chromosome Testing Order
Appealed by Child Alleging In Utero Workplace Chemical Exposure, CHEM. REG. DAILY (BNA),
June 16, 1994 (LEXIS, BNA Library, CRD file) (describing the appeal of the California Superior
Court decision in Severson v. KTI Chemicals, Inc. compelling chromosome testing of a child
afflicted with microcephaly who alleges his condition was caused by his mother's occupational
exposure to chemicals).
120. Cf. Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1137-39 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that
warrantless seizure of blood drawn from gay arrestee who had bitten police officer [to test for
HIM] violated 4th Amendment).
121. See LORI ANDREWS, MEDICAL GENETICS: A LEGAL FRONTIER 105-12 (1987)
(discussing the role of communication in the doctor-patient relationship, informed consent, and
other duties to disclose); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1246 (D.C. 1990) (holding that a competent
pregnant patient has the right to reject medical delivery procedure); Baby Boy Doe v. Mother
Doe, 632 N. E. 2d 326 (111. App. Ct. 1994) (holding that a mother cannot be forced to undergo a
cesarean section to benefit her viable fetus).
122. See COMMITTEE ON ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 4,
at 10, 260-64,276-77.
123. National Institutes of Health Workshop Statement, Reproductive Genetic Testing:
Impact on Women, in WOMEN & PRENATAL TESTING: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF GENETIC
TECHNOLOGY 295 app. at 297 (Karen H. Rothberg & Elizabeth J. Thomson eds., 1994).
124. See generally Lori B. Andrews, Prenatal Screening and the Culture of Motherhood, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 967, 996-99 (1996) (describing the protections available against mandatory genetic
testing of a fetus or its mother).
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ministic view of people as nothing more than a packet of un-
folding genes. Nelkin and Lindee ably demonstrate that such a
view is taking hold. We can envision judges finding that chil-
dren have a right, and perhaps even an obligation,1" to learn
everything they can about their genetic makeup. The child who
feels shadowed by a gene for breast cancer, obesity, attempted
rape - or even murder - may have trouble flourishing no
matter what other genes he or she received in the genetic shuf-
fle and no matter what other relationships and environmental
influences exist in his or her life.
125. In a letter to the editor of the JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, B.
Meredith Burke argued that adolescents should have a duty to learn their genetic makeup. Genetic
Testing for Children and Adolescents, 273 JAMA 1089 (1995) (letter to the editor from B.
Meredith Burke). Burke took issue with an article that stated that adolescents have a "negative
right" of deciding not to know. See id. Burke pointed out that 7.4% of girls between ages 15
through 17 become pregnant and argued that giving them the right not to know their genetic
makeup "downplays the moral and legal obligation to protect an innocent bystander." Id. (re-
ferring to the child who might be born with a genetic disease).

